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THE REJECTED APPLICANT FOR GENERAL
ASSISTANCE AND HIS RIGHT
TO A REVIEW
Welfare benefits support millions of Americans. When a welfare
recipient's benefits are terminated by administrative action, the recipient
has a constitutional right to an evidentiary hearing to contest the termi-
nation.1 When aid is initially denied to an applicant for welfare bene-
fits, however, his constitutional rights have not yet been clearly defined
by the United States Supreme Court.2  Since there has not been a defin-
itive decision on this point, an apparently arbitrary distinction now ex-
ists between the rights of a current recipient of welfare benefits and
the rights of one who has only applied for aid.
Lower courts have split on this issue in holding that due process
of law requires procedural safeguards such as the opportunity for a
fair hearing,3 and conversely, that the Constitution imposes no such
requirement.' This note will examine the constitutional requirements
that attach to the situation following the denial of an application for
general assistance. It will also explain why the better rule requires that
an opportunity for a fair hearing must be granted to dissatisfied appli-
cants for general assistance benefits. In particular, this note will focus
on how well the present procedures employed in Los Angeles County,
California, measure up to due process standards.
The Present Right to a Review
Presently, the right of an unsuccessful applicant to a review turns
on two variables. The first is the type of welfare program for which
he has applied. The second is the state or county in which the appli-
cant resides.' The type of welfare program involved is important in
1. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
2. See Alexander v. Silverman, 356 F. Supp. 1179 (E.D. Wis. 1973); Zobriscky v.
Los Angeles County, 28 Cal. App. 3d 930, 105 Cal. Rptr. 121 (1972) (hearing denied).
3. Alexander v. Silverman, 356 F. Supp. 1179 (E.D. Wis. 1973); Barnett v.
Lindsay, 319 F. Supp. 610 (D. Utah 1970).
4. Zobriscky v. Los Angeles County, 28 Cal. App. 3d 930, 105 Cal. Rptr. 121
(1972) (hearing denied).
5. See ASSISTANCE PAYMENTS ADMINISTRATION, SOCIAL AND REHABILITATION
SERV., U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUC. AND WELFARE, PuBLIc ASSISTANCE REP. No. 39,
CHARACTERISTICS OF GENERAL ASSISTANCE IN THE UNITED STATES 5 (1970 ed.) [here-
inafter cited as CHARACTERISTICS OF GENERAL ASSISTANCE].
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determining the availability of review because there are two distinct
types of welfare programs in the United States. One is federally funded
categorical assistance, and the other is locally financed general assist-
ance programs. The right to review following a denial of benefits exists
by statute in the federally funded programs, 6 but it does not necessarily
obtain in the context of general assistance programs).
The Type of Assistance
Federally Funded Categorical Assistance
The distinction between the two types of welfare is fundamental.
Federally funded categorical assistance consists of aid to indigents who
fit into two well-defined categories. These categories are aid to fami-
lies with dependent children,8 and supplemental security income for the
aged, blind, and disabled.9 These programs are supported by federal
funds which are either funneled to the recipients through various state
and local agencies,' 0 or expended directly by the federal government.'
When payments are made to recipients by state or local agencies, these
agencies must agree to follow certain federal requirements, or the fed-
eral monies will be withheld.' 2 One of the requirements imposed on
the states by the federal law is that the states grant an opportunity for
a fair hearing to an applicant following the denial of his application
for benefits.' 3
General Assistance
The other type of welfare, general assistance,14 is the focus of this
note. Every state has a program of general assistance' 5r separate and
6. 42 U.S.C. § 602(a) (4) (aid to families with dependent children), 42 U.S.C.
§ 1383(c)(1) (Supp. I, 1972) (supplemental security income for the aged, blind, and
disabled).
7. CHARACTERiSnTCS OF GNEAL ASSISTANCE, supra note 5, at 5.
8. 42 U.S.C. H§ 601-608 (1970 and Supp. II, 1972).
9. 42 U.S.C. § 1381-1385 (Supp. II, 1972). 42 U.S.C. §§ 801-805 (Supp. II,
1972) provide for federal grants to states for services to the aged, blind, or disabled.
10. 42 U.S.C. §§ 603(a), 803(a) (Supp. II, 1972).
11. 42 U.S.C. § 1383(a) (Supp. II, 1972).
12. 42 U.S.C. § 604 (1970), 42 U.S.C.A. § 804 (Supp. 11, 1972). Prior to Jan. 1,
1974, 42 U.S.C. §§ 304, 1204, 1354 (1970) also provided a means of enforcing the
federal requirements. These sections were repealed, except in Guam, Puerto Rico and
the Virgin Islands, by Pub. L. No. 92-603, §§ 301, 303(a), (b) (1972).
13. See note 6 supra.
14. General assistance is also known as "general relief," "home relief," "emer-
gency relief," "direct relief," and "outdoor relief" in various sections of the United
States. The term employed often varies within a state, and some states have more than
one type of general assistance program, each known by a different name. For purposes
of clarity, the term "general assistance" will be used in this note to include all other
names employed to denote similar programs.
15. CHrAAcr~musTIcs OF GENERAL ASSISTANCE, supra note 5, at 1.
distinct from categorical assistance programs. The general assistance
programs are administered solely by each state and its local govern-
ments. 6 General assistance is designed to aid indigents who have no
alternative means of subsistence and who fail to qualify for any of the
federally funded aid programs.17
General assistance is a public program (financed from State or
local funds) which furnishes financial assistance to needy families
or individuals primarily in their homes. Assistance may be given
in the form of money payments, assistance in kind provided di-
rectly to recipients, vendor payments for medical or remedial care,
or vendor payments for other goods and services. 18
General assistance benefits constitute the "residual fund by which indi-
gents who cannot qualify for and under any specialized aid programs
can still obtain the means of life."' 9
The distinguishing feature of general assistance is that unlike cate-
gorical assistance, general assistance is not financed by federal funds. 21
Indeed, in some states, general assistance is funded entirely by local
government. 2' In California, for example, the legislature has man-
dated that each county shall provide general assistance to its indigent
persons, 22 but unfortunately no state funding is provided for the pro-
gram. 2' The burden of support thus falls entirely on each of the state's
fifty-eight counties.
The general assistance program of each state, the District of Co-
lumbia, Guam, Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands is unique to that
jurisdiction. 24  Each program varies as to distinct purposes, conditions
of eligibility, coordination with categorical aid programs, methods of
providing assistance, financing, and hearings or appeals following the
rejection of an application for assistance. Indeed, it is not unusual
for there to be major differences in these areas within a single state.26
In short, general assistance in the United States is a complex patchwork
16. Id.; see Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 256 n.1 (1970).
17. Some states may allow a recipient to qualify for both general assistance and
categorical assistance simultaneously. State statutes and regulations vary significantly
here.
18. CHARACTERISTICS OF GENERAL ASSISTANCE, supra note 5, at 3 (emphasis
deleted).
19. Mooney v. Pickett, 4 Cal. 3d 669, 681, 483 P.2d 1231, 1239, 94 Cal. Rptr.
279, 287 (1971).
20. CHARACTERISTICS OF GENERAL ASSISTANCE, supra note 5, at 1.
21. CHARACTERISTICS OF GENERAL ASSIsTANCE, id., lists the method of financing
general assistance programs by state in item fifteen.
22. CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE § 17000 (West 1972).
23. Id.; CHARACTERISTICS OF GENERAL ASSISTANCE, supra note 5, at 15.
24. See generally CHARACTERISTICS OF GENERAL ASSISTANCE, id.
25. See id. at 3-5.
26. See notes 65-84 and accompanying text infra.
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of different programs with diverse goals and procedures, all known as
"general assistance" because they are supplementary or emergency wel-
fare programs.
The Domicile of the Applicant
The second variable, the domicile of the applicant, is also im-
portant in determining whether a right to review will follow the
denial of general assistance benefits. Provisions for hearings and ap-
peals show the same lack of consistency among the jurisdictions as
do most other general assistance regulations. 27  Seventeen states have
no statewide provision whatsoever for any hearing or appeal proce-
dure.28 However, hearing procedures do exist in parts of some of these
states. Some California counties, for example, provide for a hearing
upon denial,2" while others have no such provision.30 Ten of the re-
maining states recognize some type of administrative appeal proce-
dure,31 while twenty-three states, the District of Columbia, Guam,
Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands all provide the same right to a hear-
ing as is granted in the federally funded categorical assistance pro-
grams.32 Thus, it is the residence of the applicant, along with the type
of welfare program for which he has applied, that determines whether
or not he will be extended a right to a review of his unsuccessful
application. It is submitted that these two considerations constitute an
unnecessary and artificial barrier between the unsuccessful applicant for
general assistance benefits and his constitutional rights guaranteed by
the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
27. See generally ACHAcTErusTIcs OF GENERAL ASSiSTANCE.
28. Id. States with no statewide provision for a hearing are California, Colorado,
Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Iowa, Kentucky, Mississippi, Missouri, Nebraska,
New Hampshire, New Jersey, North Carolina, North Dakota and West Virginia.
Wisconsin has no statutory provision for hearings, however, such hearings are pro-
vided there by decision. Alexander v. Silverman, 356 F. Supp. 1179 (E.D. Wis.
1973). See notes 124-136 and accompanying text infra.
29. E.g., Alameda County, City and County of San Francisco, and Santa Clara
County. See notes 71-80 and accompanying text infra.
30. E.g., Los Angeles County and San Diego County. See notes 81-84 and ac-
companying text infra.
31. See CHARACTERISTICS OF GENERAL AssIsTANcE, supra note 5. These jurisdic-
tions are Alaska, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Michigan, Nevada, Ohio, South Dakota,
Tennessee and Texas.
32. Id. The jurisdictions that provide the same hearing, procedure for general
assistance as for categorical assistance are Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, Delaware,
District of Columbia, Guam, Hawaii, Louisiana, Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota,
Montana, New Mexico, New York, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Puerto Rico,
Rhode Island, South Carolina, Utah, Vermont, Virgin Islands, Virginia, Washington
and Wyoming. Maine joined this group of states in 1973. ME. REv. STAT. ANN.
tit. 22, §§ 4501, 4503 (Supp. 1973).
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Due Process of Law in the Welfare Context
Goldberg v. Kelly
The standards imposed by procedural due process vary in different
situations because of the elusive nature of the concept.33 Exactly which
rights obtain in a specific proceeding depends upon "[t]he nature of
the alleged right involved, the nature of the proceeding, and the possible
burden on that proceeding. .. .
In examining the "nature of the alleged rights" in the welfare
context, it appears that until recently, there existed a question as to
whether welfare benefits, from either categorical or general assistance,
were granted as a privilege or as a right. The United States Supreme
Court resolved the controversy in the landmark decision of Goldberg
v. Kelly,35 which held that welfare "benefits are a matter of statutory
entitlement for persons qualified to receive them."36 In a footnote, the
Court pointed out that to regard welfare entitlements "as more like
'property' than a 'gratuity'" may be more realistic today. 7  The opin-
ion made it clear that constitutional challenges to existing welfare ad-
ministrative procedures cannot be defeated by the argument that bene-
fits are a privilege rather than a right. 8
Goldberg explicitly applied procedural due process requirements
to general assistance programs as well as to federally funded pro-
grams. 39  The issue in Goldberg was narrowly defined by the Court
as "whether the Due Process Clause requires that the recipient [of any
type of welfare benefits] be afforded an evidentiary hearing before the
termination of benefits. ' 40  In holding that such a hearing is required
by due process, the Court noted that the standards of procedural due
process are influenced by the extent to which the recipient "may be
'condemned to suffer grievous loss.' "41
To determine exactly which procedural due process standards were
applicable, a balancing test was formulated in Goldberg. The focal
point of the test was "whether the recipient's interest in avoiding ...
loss outweighs the governmental interest in summary adjudication.
4
Because of this test, the Court's examination of the nature of the pro-
33. Hannah v. Larche, 363 U.S. 420, 442 (1960).
34. Id.
35. 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
36. Id. at 262.
37. Id. at 262 n.8.
38. Id. at 262.
39. Id. at 257-58 n.3.
40. Id. at 260.
41. Id. at 262-63, quoting Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341
U.S. 123, 168 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
42. Id. at 263.
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ceeding necessarily involved a consideration of the possible burden on
that proceeding.
The Court looked first to the interest of the recipient. Since wel-
fare benefits furnish the means necessary for a recipient to obtain the
essentials of life, if aid to him is cut off, the termination is necessarily
crucial to his subsistence. "Since he lacks independent resources, his
situation becomes immediately desperate."4 3 It follows that he will be
placed at a greater disadvantage in his attempt to seek redress from
the welfare bureaucracy if his need to concentrate upon finding sources
of support becomes so great as to occupy much of his time. This situa-
tion is a "crucial factor in [the welfare] context-a factor not present
in the case of . . . virtually anyone else whose governmental enti-
tlements are ended. . . ."" The individual in need of welfare may
not be able to afford to fight an arbitrary or mistaken adverse admin-
istrative fiat.45
Goldberg also pointed out that the government's interest lies in
affording recipients a pretermination evidentiary hearing because of the
"[n]ation's basic commitment. . . to foster the dignity and well-being
of all persons within its borders. '46 Welfare assistance is designed to
enable the impoverished to gain the same opportunities that are avail-
able to the rest of society and to encourage self-assurance by enabling
all people to participate in meaningful community activities. "The
same governmental interests that counsel the provision of welfare, coun-
sel as well its uninterrupted provision to those eligible to receive
it . . . ,,47
The Court concluded that the interest of the individual in receiving
his benefits without a hiatus "clearly outweighs" the governmental con-
cern in preventing any increase in fiscal and administrative burdens.48
Quoting from the decision in the district court below, the Supreme
Court emphasized that "[the stakes are simply too high for the welfare
recipient, and the possibility for honest error or irritable misjudgment
too great" to deny the terminee a right to an evidentiary hearing.49
Hearing procedures are also required by statute for the federally
funded categorical aid programs. Each federally funded program ad-
ministered by a state must provide a fair hearing to any person whose
claim for benefits is denied or is not acted upon with reasonable
promptness."
43. Id. at 264.
44. Id.
45. See id.
46. Id. at 264-65.
47. Id. at 265.
48. Id. at 266.
49. Id.
50. See statutes cited note 6 supra.
The federal requirements are, in effect, a complement to the Gold-
berg safeguards. Together, the statutes and the decision provide an
opportunity for a fair hearing to all terminees in both general and cate-
gorical assistance programs. The opportunity for a hearing is also ex-
tended by statute to aggrieved applicants for categorical aid programs.
The one class of persons who have neither a constitutional nor a federal
statutory right to an opportunity for a fair hearing is composed of those
applicants for general assistance who are denied benefits.
Extensions of Goldberg
Despite the decision in Goldberg and the federal requirements for
hearings in the categorical assistance programs, the United States Su-
preme Court has yet to hold that procedural due process requires a
review of an initial denial of an application for general assistance."'
While some lower courts have held that Goldberg logically must be
extended to cover the initial denial situation,52 others have balked at
any extension, 53 particularly in light of Daniel v. Goliday.54
In Daniel, a per curiam decision, the Supreme Court made it clear
that Goldberg "dealt only with termination and suspension . . . of ben-
efits." 55  It necessarily follows that Goldberg is not directly controlling
51. See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
52. See note 3 supra. Courts have enacted Goldberg in several varied, anala-
gous situations. Cf. Almenares v. Wyman, 453 F.2d 1075 (2d Cir. 1971) (hearing re-
quired for reducees and terminees of categorical assistance); Salandich v. Milwaukee
County, 351 F. Supp. 767 (E.D. Wis. 1972) (hearing required prior to termination
from county-funded work experience and training program); Serritella v. Engleman,
339 F. Supp. 738 (D.N.J. 1972) (hearing required prior to reduction, suspension, or
termination of categorical assistance); Hunt v. Edmunds, 328 F. Supp. 468 (D. Minn.
1971) (notice and hearing required prior to reduction of categorical assistance); Banner
v. Smolenski, 315 F. Supp. 1076 (D. Mass. 1970) (notice and hearing required prior
to decision to deny additional benefits to current recipients of categorical assistance).
See also cases cited in Coral Gables Convalescent Home, Inc. v. Richardson, 340 F.
Supp. 646, 649 n.1 (S.D. Fla. 1972).
53. Zobriscky v. Los Angeles County, 28 Cal. App. 3d 930, 105 Cal. Rptr. 121
(1972) (hearing denied); Cf. Wilson v. Dietz, 456 F.2d 314 (6th Cir. 1972) (notice
and opportunity for hearing prior to termination of categorical assistance is sufficient);
Russo v. Kirby, 453 F.2d 548 (2d Cir. 1971) (dictum) (request for hearing prior to
termination of categorical assistance denied because termination was based on re-inter-
pretation of law and not on factual questions); Merriweather v. Burson, 439 F.2d 1092
(5th Cir. 1971) (remanded to district court to determine, inter alia, if reduction of
general assistance benefits subjected recipients to the potential burdens found to require a
pretermination hearing in Goldberg v. Kelly); Rochester v. Ingram, 337 F. Supp. 350
(D. Del. 1972) (hearing denied where categorical assistance benefits reduced statewide
on percentage basis to all recipients); Copeland v. Parham, 330 F. Supp. 383 (N.D.
Ga. 1971) (recipient of categorical assistance who does not receive his check when
due is not automatically entitled to a hearing).
54. 398 U.S. 73 (1970).
55. Id.
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on the issue raised in the initial denial situation. Since there has been
no Supreme Court decision dealing with the procedures required by
due process following the denial of an application for general assist-
ance,56 the question remains unresolved.
Arguably, the situation presented in Goldberg, summary termina-
tion of benefits, is distinguishable from the circumstances present fol-
lowing an initial denial. An individual already receiving assistance de-
pends on the continued receipt of payments to provide for his means
of subsistence. He has adjusted to a life style in accordance with the
payments. The payments arrive on a regular basis, and their amount
is known to the recipient in advance.
Additionally, once the recipient's eligibility for welfare benefits has
been administratively determined, his rights clearly become subject to
due process safeguards. To deny such an individual his assistance pay-
ments during a controversy over his eligibility "may deprive an eligible
recipient of the very means by which to live while he waits.""
The person who has unsuccessfully applied for general assistance
benefits does not rely on welfare benefits for his continued support,
although he undoubtedly hopes that in the future he will be able to
depend on a welfare check. Furthermore, his status has been adminis-
tratively settled; he is not eligible for receipt of general assistance pay-
ments.
Despite the distinction, it is possible that the unsuccessful appli-
cant, like the recipient, is eligible for benefits provided under general
assistance. For example, if an individual's application for general as-
sistance has been mistakenly denied because of an error in interpreta-
tion by the social worker,58 that person is still legally entitled to wel-
fare benefits. Without an opportunity for an impartial review of his
case, the applicant may be forced to continue to live without the benefit
of his "statutory entitlement." 59
Soon after the Goldberg decision, the United States District Court
of Utah recognized the similarity between the termination and the re-
jection of benefits. In Barnett v. Lindsay, the court held that the proce-
dural safeguards announced in Goldberg must be applied "at all stages
of the welfare process whenever the proposed administrative action con-
56. See note 1 supra.
57. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 264 (1970).
58. An application might be incorrectly denied for other reasons also: a mis-
take in arithmetic, a misinterpretation of the eligibility regulations, or an unclear appli-
cation form.
59. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 262 (1970); Alexander v. Silverman, 356
F. Supp. 1179, 1180 (E.D. Wis. 1973). An appellate court might also provide judicial
review upon a showing of abuse of discretion by the welfare agency. Cf. Zobriscky
v. Los Angeles County, 28 Cal. App. 3d 930, 933, 105 Cal. Rptr. 121, 123 (1973).
templates the denial or termination of statutorily created welfare bene-
fits.,,60
Just as the entitlement is created by statute for the benefit of
needy persons meeting specified qualifications, so the rights sur-
rounding that entitlement are created when the statutorily defined
need arises and not after the benefits have been dispensed. Con-
sequently, it is at this time that the constitutional protections sur-
rounding those rights must be first applied.'
Like the terminee whose rights were recognized and protected in the
Goldberg decision, the applicant for general assistance benefits whose
claim has been improperly denied has a right to receive welfare pay-
ments; his claim should be allowed. In order to obtain recognition
and protection of his right, some type of administrative review is re-
quired.
The indigent applicant stands in a situation analogous to that faced
by the terminee in Goldberg. The applicant also "lacks independent
resources [and] his situation becomes immediately desperate. His need
to concentrate upon finding the means for daily subsistence, in turn,
adversely affects his ability to seek redress from the welfare bureau-
cracy." 2 The Supreme Court correctly perceived the extreme helpless-
ness of the indigent in a situation of "brutal need." 63  In a footnote,
the Court added that the impaired adversary position of the indigent "is
particularly telling in light of the welfare bureaucracy's difficulties in
reaching correct decisions on eligibility."64
Merely because the applicant for benefits has managed to survive
without general assistance should have no bearing on his right to a
fair determination of his qualification for welfare. It makes little dif-
ference to an indigent person if his benefits are not forthcoming be-
cause they have been summarily terminated or because his application
has been mistakenly and summarily denied.65 Indeed, the reasons ad-
vanced by the Court in Goldberg apply no less forcefully to one who
has received no previous public benefits. A recent federal court case,
Alexander v. Silverman,66 agreed and decided that "[it would be irra-
tional to hold that an individual's entitlement to welfare is affected by
whether he has been receiving welfare in the past."67 In other words,
the distinction here is one without a real difference, at least as to the
60. Barnett v. Lindsay, 319 F. Supp. 610, 612 (D. Utah 1970).
61. Id.
62. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 264 (1970).
63. Id. at 261, quoting Kelly v. Wyman, 294 F. Supp. 893, 899-900 (S.D.N.Y.
1968).
64. Id. at 264 n.12.
65. Alexander v. Silverman, 356 F. Supp. 1179, 1180 (E.D. Wis. 1973).
66. 356 F. Supp. 1179 (E.D. Wis. 1973).
67. Id. at 1180.
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question of whether procedural due process requires a review following
the initial denial of an application for general assistance. Even so, the
distinction has not been erased, and the confusion over exactly what
rights obtain to dissatisfied applicants for general assistance persists.
Variations in General Assistance Programs
General assistance programs vary significantly from one state to
another. The amount and type of aid available is different in each
state, and the administrative procedures employed are similarly piece-
meal. 8 Furthermore, it is common to find a significant lack of con-
sistency and uniformity even within a single state. 9
The California Example
California is a typical example of such internal variations. The
California legislature has mandated that each of the state's counties
"shall relieve and support all incompetent, poor, indigent persons, and
those incapacitated by age, disease or accident. . . when such persons
are not [otherwise] supported. . .. ,,70 Each county must "adopt stand-
ards of aid and care" for its dependent poor.71 While the counties
have broad discretion in setting the eligibility standards for applicants
and the type and amount of aid granted to recipients, the California
Supreme Court has made it clear that the counties' discretion "can be
exercised only within fixed boundaries."7 2  Local regulations, therefore,
must be consistent with the legislative mandate.
7
1
A further constraint on local determinations of eligibility standards
for general assistance exists because no state funding is provided for
the program in California.74  Clearly, the nature of each county pro-
gram is directly affected by the amount of local monies channeled into
general assistance.
Hearing procedures also differ among the counties. Since each
county administers its own independent general assistance program, it
also decides on the appeal procedure it will make available to dissatis-
fied applicants."
68. See generally CHARAcTEmsTIcs oF GENERAL AssIsTANcE, supra note 5.
69. Id.
70. CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE § 17000 (West 1972).
71. Id. § 17001.
72. Mooney v. Pickett, 4 Cal. 3d 669, 679, 483 P.2d 1231, 1237, 94 Cal. Rptr.
279, 285 (1971).
73. Id.
74. CHARACTERSTICS oF GENERAL ASSISTANCE, supra note 5, at 15.
75. Goldberg v. Kelly requires certain procedural standards be observed prior to
termination of a recipient of general assistance. 397 U.S. 254 (1970); see text accom-
panying notes 35-49 supra.
Hearing Procedure Employed in Five California Counties
Some California counties provide hearing procedures for rejected
general assistance applicants. These procedures are similar to those
formulated for terminees in Goldberg v. Kelly.76 Indeed, Alameda
County grants applicants for and recipients of general assistance a
"right to appeal and to have a fair hearing with respect to any" denial,
termination or reduction of aid.7" The county's social service agency
is required to give written notice of any adverse action to the applicant
or recipient, including notice of his right to counsel, his right to review
the records, the right to interview witnesses in advance of the hearing,
and the right to present testimony and to cross-examine adverse wit-
nesses."s The county also provides an impartial hearing officer who
must base his decision "solely on the evidence . . . presented at the
hearing. . . . ". The final decision must be in writing.
80
Santa Clara County also grants "the right to appeal adverse ac-
tion" to recipients of and applicants for general assistance.8" Notice
of the individual's right to appeal and of his right to counsel accompany
notification of any decision on eligibility. 82  The appeal is technically
made to the Santa Clara County Board of Supervisors, which then may
delegate the "actual hearing of the issues and rendering of a decision"
to the county counsel. A further appeal to the full board of super-
visors may also be taken. 83
An informal hearing procedure is also available to all applicants
for or recipients of general assistance in the city and county of San
Francisco. 84  The hearing is to be conducted by an impartial person;
76. 397 U.S. 254 (1970); see text accompanying notes 35-49 supra.
77. ALAMEDA COUNTY, CAL., ORDINANCE CODE § 9-3.0 (1971) (emphasis added).
Alameda County granted general assistance benefits to 5,161 people in April, 1973.
STATE OF CALIFORNIA, HEALTH AND WELFARE AGENCY, DEP'T OF SOCIAL WELFARE,
PUBLIC WELFARE IN CALIFORNIA (Health and Welfare Agency Statistical Series PA 3-
163) Table 10a (April 1973) [hereinafter cited as PUBLIC WELFARE IN CALIFORNIA].
78. ALAMEDA COUNTY, CAL., ORDINANCE CODE §§ 9-3.0, 9-3.2 (1971).
79. Id. § 9-3.3.
80. Id. § 9-3.7.
81. Santa Clara County, Cal., Dep't of Social Services, General Assistance Fair
Hearings (Appeals) 1 (Dep't Memo. No. 72-255, Aug. 8, 1972). Santa Clara
County had 4,230 recipients of general assistance benefits in April, 1973. PUBLIC WEL-
FARE IN CALIFORNIA, supra note 77, at Table 10a.
82. See Santa Clara County, Cal., Dep't of Social Services, Form GA 239 (Notice
of Proposed Action) (revised Aug. 23, 1972).
83. Santa Clara County, Cal., Dep't of Social Services, General Assistance Fair
Hearings (Appeals) 1 (Dep't Memo. No. 72-255, Aug. 8, 1972).
84. City and County of San Francisco, Cal., General Assistance Manual §§ 98-1,
98-2, at 1 (1972). The city and county of San Francisco granted general assistance
payments to an estimated 7,460 people in April, 1973. PUBLIC WELFARE IN CALIFORNIA,
supra note 77, at Table 10a.
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the individual has the right to counsel. The right to confront and cross-
examine witnesses is granted to the indigent, and the decision, in writ-
ing, must be based solely on the evidence presented at the hearing.
A further review by a senior supervisor of the county social services
department is assured. 5
Other California counties extend considerably fewer procedural
safeguards to unsuccessful applicants for general assistance. San Diego
County apparently has no formal hearing procedure at all. If a person
is denied assistance, he must appeal directly to the county board of
supervisors. Normally, the board authorizes an investigation, which
may be conducted either by the welfare department director, the office
of the county counsel, or by any other person designated by the board.
Based on the investigative findings, the board makes a final, administra-
tively nonappealable decision."6
Los Angeles County, California's most populous, has no formal
hearing procedure for its "general relief" program. 7 Instead, the
county has a multistep, informal administrative appeal procedure re-
ferred to as a "Complaint Procedure." The following excerpt from
the Los Angeles County Department of Public Social Services General
Relief Manual recites the procedure to be followed if a client is dissatis-
fied.
If the client has a complaint regarding the handling of any aspect
of his case, except termination or reduction, the worker shall at-
tempt to handle the complaint satisfactorily.
If the client is still dissatisfied, the worker shall take the matter up
with his immediate supervisor. Whenever agreement is not reached
at this level, the matter shall then be taken up with the appropriate
Deputy District Director and then the District Director, if necessary.
When a complaint reaches the level of District Director, the Di-
rector should, in most circumstances, arrange an interview with
the client.
In those instances where the complaint cannot be handled satis-
factorily within the district, districts should proceed in one of the
two following ways:
1. If the problem concerns either eligibility or program interpreta-
tion, the Director shall send the case, along with an explana-
85. City and County of San Francisco, Cal., General Assistance Manual § 98-1,
98-2, at 1 (1972).
86. Letter from Bernice Minyard, ACSW, Communication Coordinator, Dep't
of Public Welfare, County of San Diego, Cal., to the author, Aug. 13, 1973. San Diego
County's general assistance program, known there as "general relief," provided
benefits to 3,826 people in April, 1973. PUBLIC WELFARE IN CALo.nAOPN, supra note
77, at Table 10a.
87. Los Angeles County, Cal., Dep't of Public Social Services, General Relief
Manual § 40-107.21 (1973); Los Angeles County reported 14,751 recipients of "gen-
eral relief' in April, 1973. PUBLIC WELFARE IN CAuFoRNIA, supra note 77, at Table
10a.
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tory gram, to the Program Deputy for General Relief for re-
view.
2. If the program concerns anything other than eligibility or pro-
gram interpretation, the matter shall be referred to the appro-
priate Division Chief for action.88
Thus, the Los Angeles County complaint procedures provide only for
a series of administrative reviews of an application. The review pro-
gresses through the hierarchy of the social service agency without af-
fording the applicant an opportunity for a formal hearing of his griev-
ance.
In short, five populous California counties each follow a different
appeal procedure in general assistance cases. Any recourse a dissatis-
fied client may receive from a county agency is granted only because
of the grace of the local authorities. Hearing procedures are not uni-
formly based on legislative enactment, nor are they necessarily designed
with Fourteenth Amendment due process safeguards in mind.
Zobriscky v. Los Angeles County
In the recent case of Zobriscky v. Los Angeles County,89 the
California District Court of Appeal for the Second District refused to
grant an evidentiary hearing to all persons who were denied general
assistance benefits. 90 Roger Zobriscky filed an application for general
relief in Los Angeles County, and it was summarily denied by the pub-
lic social service agency. Likewise, his request for an evidentiary hear-
ing from the agency to contest the decision was summarily refused. The
applicant then filed a class action in Superior Court for the County
of Los Angeles, petitioning the trial court to mandate the county, the
department and its director to hold an evidentiary hearing on his appli-
cation and on the applications of other similarly situated applicants.
His petition was denied, and he appealed the trial court's ruling to the
California District Court of Appeal.9 '
The court of appeal defined the issue in broad terms to be
"whether as a matter of constitutional law [the applicant] is entitled
to an evidentiary hearing in connection with the denial of his applica-
tion for public welfare benefits." 92 The court held that procedural due
process did not require the county welfare department to grant ag-
grieved applicants a hearing following the denial of their claims for
general relief.93 The California Supreme Court denied the applicant's
88. Los Angeles County, Cal., Dep't of Public Social Services, General Relief
Manual § 40-107.21 (1973).
89. 28 Cal. App. 3d 930, 105 Cal. Rptr. 121 (1972).
90. Id. at 933, 105 Cal. Rptr. at 123.
91. Id. at 931-32, 105 Cal. Rptr. at 122.
92. Id. at 932, 105 Cal. Rptr. at 122.
93. Id. at 933, 105 Cal. Rptr. at 123.
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request for a hearing of the controversy. 4
The court began its opinion with a discussion of the constitutional
question, noting that Goldberg v. Kelly was not directly controlling be-
cause that decision "focused its attention on termination of an estab-
lished welfare benefit. . . ."5 Referring to the per curiamn decision
of the United States Supreme Court in Daniel v. Goliday,96 the court
of appeal reasoned that the issue of the "necessity for an evidentiary
hearing to deny an application for welfare benefits remains open.1
97
The decision went on to say that a requirement of an evidentiary
hearing each time an application for general assistance is denied would
place an "overwhelming" burden on county government.
The resulting increase in the cost of administration of the general
relief program brought about by the cost of such hearings would
necessarily reduce the net amount of moneys available for general
relief purposes, and in this sense mandatory evidentiary hearings
would work at cross-purposes to the primary objective of welfare
itself.98
The final holding was that such a requirement was "neither necessary
nor desirable nor required as a matter of due process of law."9
In its opinion, the court of appeal noted that Zobriscky had failed
to allege that he had exhausted the administrative appeal procedures'"0
that were available to him. 10' Had he exhausted his administrative rem-
edies, the petitioner could have requested judicial relief by alleging that
the department had abused its discretion. "If he can make a prima
facie showing that his application has been improperly denied, the
courts by appropriate order may remedy any injustice he appears to
have suffered. Such a remedial order might well require the adminis-
trative agency directly concerned to hold an evidentiary hearing."10 2 On
94. It should be noted that the denial of a hearing does not indicate that the
issue is closed. The California Supreme Court explained its procedure in DiGenova
v. State Bd. of Educ., 57 Cal. 2d 167, 178, 367 P.2d 865, 871, 18 Cal. Rptr. 369, 375
(1962): "Although this court's denial of a hearing is not to be regarded as expressing
approval of the propositions of law set forth in an opinion of the District Court of
Appeal or as having the same authoritative effect as an earlier decision of this court,
it does not follow that such a denial is without significance as to our views."
95. Zobriscky v. Los Angeles County, 28 Cal. App. 3d 930, 932, 105 Cal. Rptr.
121, 122 (1972).
96. 398 U.S. 73 (1970).
97. Zobriscky v. Los Angeles County, 28 Cal. App. 3d 930, 932, 105 Cal. Rptr.
121, 123 (1972).
98. Id. at 933, 105 Cal. Rptr. at 123.
99. Id.
100. See text accompanying notes 87-88 supra regarding the Los Angeles County
complaint procedures.
101. Zobriscky v. Los Angeles County, 28 Cal. App. 3d 930, 933, 105 Cal. Rptr.
121, 123 (1972).
102. Id.
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the facts of Zobriscky, however, the court of appeal stated that the
petitioner had not made such a prima facie showing. Instead, he had
alleged only that he was forced to apply for benefits from the county's
general relief program.1
0 3
Possibly the court thought that it should avoid extending a con-
stitutional guarantee to cover an "open" question. Normally, courts
do not "anticipate a question of constitutional law in advance of the
necessity of deciding it .. ."" This is especially true for an inter-
mediate court of appeal such as the California District Court of Appeal.
Since neither Goldberg v. Kelly nor any other higher court's decision are
directly on point, the court of appeal is not bound to decide the issue one
way or another.
The court's broad definition of the issue in Zobriscky provides
another possible justification for its result. Because anyone can apply
for general assistance, a blanket rule which guarantees a hearing to
all whose applications are denied may place an extremely heavy burden
on the state. For example, a person earning $50,000 per year may
apply for welfare. Although this person is certain to be denied aid,
if a blanket rule were to exist requiring a hearing, even this well-to-
do applicant would be entitled to one.
Had the court defined the issue more narrowly to exclude such
frivolous claims, the decision might have been different. The petitioner
in Zobriscky claimed that he was asking merely for notice and an op-
portunity for a hearing.10 5 If this were the case, a decision could not
be based upon the great burden presented by mandatory hearings. In-
stead, the court would have had to consider the effect of a different
burden on the county welfare system. That burden would be the task
of furnishing an explanation for each denial of general assistance, along
with an opportunity for the aggrieved applicant to be heard.
In any case, the court's discussion of procedural due process in
Zobriscky is unclear. It fails to consider carefully many of the facets
of that doctrine. Due process encompasses, among other things, the
opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful man-
ner, 0 6 in a fashion that is tailored to the capacities as well as to the
103. Id. at 933-34, 105 Cal. Rptr. at 123.
104. Liverpool, N.Y. & Phila. S.S. Co. v. Commissioners of Emigration, 113 U.S.
33, 39 (1885); accord, Communist Party of the United States v. Subversive Activities
Control Bd., 367 U.S. 1, 71-72 (1961); United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303, 329
(1946); Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288, 346-47 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
105. Petitioner's Brief for Hearing at 9, Zobriscky v. Los Angeles County, 28 Cal.
App. 3d 930, 105 Cal. Rptr. 121 (1972). Unfortunately, this distinction was not made
clear in the petitioner's brief. For instance, petitioner contends that "[alpplicants for
general relief who are denied benefits are entitled to contest the denial of their rights
to subsistence benefits." Id. at 11.
106. Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965).
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circumstances of the individual. °7 It requires that the individual who
is faced with an impending governmental action which turns on a ques-
tion of fact has the right to confront and cross-examine adverse wit-
nesses.Y'3 In administrative proceedings, an impartial decision maker is
necessary; he must prepare a statement of the reasons supporting his
decision. 109 Furthermore, due process of law may also extend to the
aggrieved individual the right to have counsel present.110 Sadly, the
Zobriscky opinion is silent on all of these points.
In applying the procedural safeguards imposed by due process of
law to a specific situation, a court must look to "[t]he nature of the al-
leged right involved, the nature of the proceeding, and the possible bur-
den on that proceeding. . . .""' Nowhere does the opinion in Zo-
briscky consider the nature of the alleged rights involved. Indeed, it
even fails to take notice of the Supreme Court's pronouncement in
Goldberg that welfare is a "statutory entitlement for persons qualified
to receive" benefits."12
Nor does the Zobriscky court consider the quasi-judicial nature
of the proceeding and the resulting relationship to the procedural due
process doctrine. The Supreme Court has pointed out that administra-
tive agencies are bound by constitutionally mandated procedural re-
quirements when they exercise quasi-judicial functions.
[Wlhen governmental agencies adjudicate or make binding de-
terminations which directly affect the legal ights of indviduals, it
is imperative that those agencies use the procedures which have
been traditionally associated with the judicial process."13
The Supreme Court has clearly indicated that it considers the mainte-
nance of strict procedural standards by administrative agencies engaged
in quasi-judicial functions to be of the highest importance."
4
The court of appeal did consider "the possible burden on the pro-
ceeding" when it accepted the "logjam" argument advanced by the
county. Nonetheless, an analysis of the opinion reveals the court's fail-
ure to examine carefully the available examples of similar hearing pro-
cedures in current operation.
Significantly, there are hearing procedures currently in effect
across the nation in the federally funded categorical assistance pro-
107. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 268-69 (1970).
108. Id. at 269; Willner v. Committee on Character & Fitness, 373 U.S. 96,
103-04 (1963).
109. Goldberg v. Kelly, 297 U.S. 254, 271 (1970); cf. Wong Yang Sung v. Mc-
Grath, 339 U.S. 33, 45-46 (1950).
110. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 270-71 (1970).
111. Hannah v. Larche, 363 U.S. 420, 442 (1960).
112. 397 U.S. 254, 262 (1970).
113. Hannah v. Larche, 363 U.S. 420, 442 (1960).
114. See generally Morgan v. United States, 304 U.S. 1, 22 (1938).
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grams. 115 Several California counties, notably Alameda County, also
have some type of formal hearing procedures in operation in their gen-
eral assistance programs.'1 6 There is no available evidence that the
operation of these programs has been hampered by the available hear-
ing process. Indeed, as the government argued in Goldberg, "most
terminations are accepted without challenge" by the recipient. 117 Log-
ically, unsuccessful applicants for welfare benefits would make even
fewer challenges to agency decisions; recipients are apt to be better
acquainted with the welfare system than those who have had initial
applications denied.
The Zobriscky court feared that a contrary decision would wreak
havoc on the welfare system, and consequently, it refused to consider
properly the "logjam" issue in depth. Instead of examining the similar
hearing procedures operating in federally funded programs and in other
California general assistance programs, the court merely concluded that
to require hearings in all denial cases would work at cross-purposes
with the county's general assistance program."18
Nor did the court of appeal look to past United States Supreme
Court decisions for guidance. The Court has long held that the consti-
tutional rights of an individual may override the government's desire
for expediency. 19 Mr. Justice Cardozo made it clear that the individ-
ual has a right to be protected against arbitrary action by an administra-
tive agency:
All the more insistent is the need, when power has been bestowed
so freely [upon an administrative agency], that the "inexorable
safeguard" of a fair and open hearing be maintained in its in-
tegrity. The right to such a hearing is one of "the rudiments of
fair play" assured to every litigant by the Fourteenth Amendment
as a minimal requirement. There can be no compromise on the
footing of convenience or expediency, or because of a natural de-
sire to be rid of harassing delay, when that minimal requirement
has been neglected or ignored.
120
In short, the burden placed on the proceeding must be an extremely
heavy one before the governmental desire for summary disposition is
properly allowed to take precedence over the procedural safeguards af-
forded the individual.
Rather than thoroughly analyzing the constitutional question
raised by the controversy, the Zobriscky court briefly considered the
115. See note 6 supra.
116. See text accompanying notes 77-88 supra.
117. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. at 265.
118. Zobriscky v. Los Angeles County, 28 Cal. App. 3d at 933, 105 Cal. Rptr.
at 123.
119. Ohio Bel Tel. Co. v. PUC, 301 U.S. 292, 304-05 (1937).
120. Id.
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burden posed by mandatory hearings following every denial of an appli-
cation for general assistance. It did not consider the narrower issue
advanced by the petitioner. Had it done so, a solution might have
been fashioned which would ensure due process safeguards without de-
stroying the welfare system. For example, the court might have lim-
ited the scope of the hearing requirement to those applicants whose
applications showed their prima facie eligibility and to those who were
challenging the agency's interpretation of the eligibiltiy criteria. How-
ever, the court's analysis failed to include such an alternative possibil-
ity. Instead the court summarily dispatched the constitutional chal-
lenge before it. Its resulting discussion of procedural due process is
necessarily unclear and confusing.
Following its rejection of the petitioner's claim, the court noted
that Zobriscky could rely on the administrative remedies provided by
by the county.121 Furthermore, if the county complaint procedures did
not work to the satisfaction of the applicant, he could always turn to
the courts for remedial aid.'22
This concept of a remedy clashes with Goldberg's concern that an
indigent person might be placed unnecessarily and wrongly in "brutal
need.' 23 Unfortunately, the court of appeal did not consider whether
any subsequent remedial order the court might conceivably fashion
could act as a true remedy for the "immediately desperate" predicament
faced by a wrongly denied applicant. The court was unimpressed with
applicant's need and desire for a speedy solution to the eligibility con-
troversy.
The Wisconsin Solution
A solution which embodies procedural safeguards without placing
an unwieldy burden on the local social service agency was devised
in the recent case of Alexander v. Silverman.24 In Alexander, 'a class
action like Zobriscky, the plaintiffs had applied for general relief, Wis-
consin's general assistance program. When their applications were
summarily denied, they requested a statement of reasons and an admin-
istrative hearing from the Milwaukee County Department of Public
Welfare. The application of at least one plaintiff did not indicate on
its face that she was ineligible for assistance. Both the statement. and
the hearing were denied by the welfare department.
25
121. Zobriscky v. Los Angeles County, 28 Cal. App. 3d at 933, 105 Cal. Rptr.
at 123.
122. Id.
123. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. at 261.
124. 356 F. Supp. 1179 (E.D. Wis. 1973).
125. Id.
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The plaintiffs contended that the department's policy violated the
due process requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment. The United
States District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin agreed, and
granted the plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment.
Although the fact situation presented in Alexander, like that in
Zobriscky, is distinguishable from that in Goldberg v. Kelly, 26 the
Wisconsin court based its decision on the principles enunciated in
Goldberg."2  Thus, it held that "[ilt would be irrational to hold that
an individual's entitlement to welfare is affected by whether he has been
receiving welfare in the past.'
'1 28
The Alexander court then followed the path cleared by Goldberg
and balanced the interests of the individual and the government to de-
termine the exact procedures required by due process of law. 129 Turn-
ing to the interests of the individual, the court noted that a mistaken
denial of benefits might deprive a person of the very means of his sub-
sistence. The court then compared the interests of prospective
terminees with the interests of aggrieved applicants. "[Tlhe interest
of applicants in having a meaningful opportunity to point out error
to the decisionmakers is just as overwhelming."' 130  To give such a
right to an applicant "will increase the state's expenses but not to such
a significant extent as to justify denying such a right. .. ."' The
court also perceived that the post-denial hearing would be available only
to those persons who submit applications which do not indicate prima
facie ineligibility.1
2
Taking into account the indirect costs to the state of providing the
hearings requested-such as the tendency of administrators who
must defend a decision denying relief to err on the side of granting
relief, especially when the applicant is likely to request a hearing-
the reasoning of Goldberg suggests that the plaintiffs' interest in
having the post-denial hearings outweighs the defendants' interest
in avoiding them.'
33
Rather than fashioning the format of the post-denial hearings, the
court deemed it wiser to leave the details up to the welfare administra-
tion, subject to the proviso that the minimum elements of due process
necessary to insure a meaningful review were present.'
34
126. Alexander and Zobriscky are concerned with the rights of dissatisfied ap-
plicants for general assistance, while Goldberg discusses the rights of terminees of all
types of welfare benefits.
127. Alexander v. Silverman, 356 F. Supp. at 1179.








February 1974] REVIEW OF GENERAL ASSISTANCE DENIAL 697
Before granting an order, the court enumerated the relevant due
process safeguards as follows:
1. A written statement containing the reasons for denying the
applicant's request for general relief and informing the applicant of
his right to a timely and impartial administrative hearing.
2. A hearing on request in which-
(a) The applicant has the opportunity to present his own argu-
ments and evidence orally by himself or with counsel of his own
choosing;
(b) The applicant has an opportunity to cross-examine the wit-
nesses relied on by the department;
(c) The decision must rest solely upon the legal rules and evi-
dence adduced at the hearing, and where there is an issue of cred-
ibility or veracity concerning, for example, whether the applicant
left his most recent employment for a "valid reason," the decision
may not rest on mere uncorroborated hearsay;
(d) The decisionmakers will not have participated in making the
determination under review.
3. A brief written statement after the hearing indicating the rea-
sons for the final determination and the evidence relied upon.- 5
The Alexander court excluded from coverage of its order those
applicants whose applications showed prima facie ineligibility. The or-
der does apply, however, to cases where the application raises an issue
of fact or judgment.' 36 Thus, the court realized that it need not make
a blanket extension of the hearing procedures to all dissatisfied appli-
cants.
In its opinion, the court grappled with and resolved the two fac-
tors that the California District Court of Appeal so cursorily discussed
in Zobriscky. First, the Wisconsin decision considered the constitu-
tional issue in depth and explained the exact procedures that were
required to insure that due process safeguards were maintained. Next,
the court carefully considered the effect that its decision would have
on the welfare bureaucracy's ability to provide benefits. While the
added procedures it mandated would increase governmental expenses
in administering the general relief program, the decision correctly con-
cluded that the expenses was justified by the great interest of the ag-
grieved applicants in obtaining an accurate accounting of- their right
to benefits.
Conclusion
What constitutes a constitutionally acceptable review of a rejected
application for general assistance? The interplay of two important in-
terests against a background of need, expediency, politics and the con-
135. Id. at 1180-81.
136. Id. at 1181-82.
cepts of fair play and justice creates an opportunity for diverse solutions
to this question. On the one hand, the rights of the aggrieved indigent
must be considered. On the other hand, the responsibility of the gov-
ernment in maintaining an orderly disbursement of welfare benefits
must not be forgotten.
In Zobriscky v. Los Angeles County, the California District Court
of Appeal decided that the governmental interest in summary disposi-
tion of applicants was essential to the orderly continuation of the wel-
fare machinery. This note has sought to show that the rationale of
this decision is constitutionally infirm.
It is submitted that the solution fashioned by the Wisconsin court
in Alexander v. Silverman is both legally sound and administratively
practical. 137  The burden on the government is reduced by restricting
the hearing procedures to those applicants who are not prima facie in-
eligible for general assistance, while the need for review of improperly
or mistakenly denied applications is met. Moreover, the common weal
is served by improving the accuracy of eligibility determinations for
general assistance, since accuracy is a concommitant duty of the govern-
ment in administering the rights of applicants for general asisstance.
The Alexander solution goes far in mitigation of the "brutal need" of
a rejected general assistance applicant. The adoption of this position,
rather than the current piecemeal, haphazard approach to providing
welfare assistance, is necessary if the welfare system is to strive toward
its goal of supplying relief for all persons in an "immediately desperate"
situation.
Richard A. Rogan*
137. The procedures followed in Alameda County, Cal., are quite similar to those
prescribed in Alexander. They differ significantly only in that Alameda County does
not restrict the hearing procedures to those who are not prima facie ineligible. See
text accompanying notes 77-80 supra.
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